Start Of Something New

Naturally, I am quite hesitant to post my thoughts and opinions in the social media because I am not that confident to do so. As a requirement in school, i have created this blog spot. But on the second thought, I find this idea to be something that is out of the ordinary from someone like me. A deviation from the usual that maybe, somehow, can unleash the hidden “blogger” in me (if there is any 😄). Thus, I’m hoping that I will be able to continue posting and updating this blog spot despite of my hectic schedule at work and in school.

DISCRIMINATORY PUNISHMENT OF THE MARITAL INFIDELITY LAW (Article 333 and 334 of the Revised Penal Code)

INTRODUCTION

 

Marital infidelity is a breach of the marital relationship by either of the husband or the wife. In other countries, adultery is the only form of marital infidelity. It is defined as the voluntary sexual intercourse between a married person and a person who is not his or her spouse. In the Philippines, there are two forms of marital infidelity. That which is committed by the wife is adultery and that which is committed by the husband is concubinage.

 

In the past, this has been an accepted norm in the form of polygamous marriage since the man was allowed to have more than one wife. As time went by, the Filipino culture had changed and polygamy became unacceptable in the society but marital infidelity has not been avoided. The Revised Penal Code (RPC) considers adultery and concubinage as crimes and provides for the punishment of both to protect the sanctity of marriage, and more importantly, the family as the foundation of the nation

 

However, there seems to be an imbalance in the treatment of men and women found guilty of the crime. While both aim to punish the marital infidelity of the spouses, there is higher burden put on wives than on husbands. The penalty imposed is higher on married women who commit infidelity as compared to married men. The penalty for women ranges from two years, four months and one day to a maximum of six years, while the penalty for men ranges from only six months and one day to a maximum of four years and two months.

 

The disparity of treatment seems to be gender-biased and discriminatory. It seems to accept the infidelity of men as normal, but more stringent on women who are expected to be faithful to their husbands.

 

Section 12 of RA 9710 or the Magna Carta of Women (MCW) provides for the amendment or repeal of laws that are discriminatory to women. The 1987 Constitution, Article II, Section 14 provides that the State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.

 

Thus, Article 333 and 334 of the RPC which provides for the punishment of adultery and concubinage should be revised in order to address the issue of inequality produced by the current provision.

 

 

BODY

 

The National Commission for Women defines marital infidelity as a violation or breach of good faith and confidence by one or both spouses to the matrimonial vows. It is also a major spousal pressure that eventually causes the breakdown of marriage as a foundation of the family.

 

In Europe, adultery is no longer a crime. Among the Western European countries to repeal their laws were Italy, Malta, Luxemborg, France, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Belgium, Switzerland and Austria.

 

In the Western countries, the United States is one of the few industrialized countries to have laws criminalizing adultery. As of 2017, adultery remains a criminal offense in 21 states, but prosecutions are rare.

 

Among non-Muslim countries in Asia, it is only Taiwan and Philippines which define marital infidelity as a crime. In India, Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code states that adultery may be committed only by a man who engages in sex with the wife of another man who did not consent to the act.[1] At first it can be viewed as discriminatory against men, but substantially it is degrading to women as it treats them as their husband’s property. A husband can consent to his wife’s adultery and she will not incur any criminal liability. In South Korea, the nation’s top court abolished the law that made adultery punishable with a prison term. In China, marital infidelity is more of a moral than a legal crime as they do not have any legal provision to punish such act. In Japan, adultery and infidelity are time-honored Japanese traditions for the nation’s men.

 

In the Philippines, before the arrival of the Spaniards, the native Filipinos already had their own relationship practices. One of those is the usual practice of polygamy. Early Filipino tribal man had five or more wives, a marital ethnic norm at that time. When the Spaniards arrived and introduced Catholicism to the natives, the missionaries promoted Christian ideas of the wife’s fidelity to her husband, premarital virginity, and the notion of a woman’s role as a nurturing mother and the reverence of the Virgin Mary. [2] Perhaps it was then that monogamy has become more acceptable in the society rather than the traditional practice of polygamy, except for those who have not converted to Catholicism such as the Muslim community and other indigenous tribes. But even those who were converted, extra-marital affairs were not prevented. This was mostly hidden from the society to avoid judgment. As time went by, aside from being an unacceptable social and moral norm in most Filipinos, having extra-marital affairs or what is commonly known as adultery and concubinage has been included in the crimes punishable by law.

 

At present, adultery and concubinage is considered as crimes against chastity. In the Revised Penal Code, both crimes are punished by prision correccional in its minimum and maximum periods. But charging a husband for an extra-marital affair in court is harder to prove since the wife has to prove any or all of the following: a.) He has kept a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, b.) He shall have sexual intercourse with a woman who is not his wife under scandalous circumstances, and/or c.) He shall cohabit with her in any other place. On the other hand, for a wife to be charged with adultery, proof of sexual intercourse between a wife and another man who knew of her civil status is all a husband needs to charge her with adultery. The penalty for the husband’s concubine is destierro while for the man in adultery is the same as that of the guilty wife. [3]

 

The ways of proving the crimes of adultery and concubinage seems to be unfair on the part of women because it is usually hard to prove that the husband had kept a mistress in the conjugal dwelling or cohabited in any other place. While the proof to convict a wife for adultery which is the sexual intercourse to a man who had knowledge that she is married is easier to prove compared to the case of concubinage. Moreover, the penalty for a concubine is lighter than the penalty of the man in an adulterous affair.

 

In the case of Ocampo vs People of the Philippines, the court held that Luis Ocampo was found guilty of the crime of concubinage and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty from six months of arresto mayor to two years and eleven months and ten days of prision correccional, while his concubine Igmedia Refe was punished with destierro. Destierro is the banishment or only a prohibition from residing within the radius of 25 kilometers from the actual residence of the accused for a special length of time. Destierro is not equivalent to imprisonment.

 

In the case of Virgilio Maquilan vs Dita Maquilan, the wife Dita and her paramour were both convicted with the crime of adultery and sentenced to suffer an imprisonment ranging from one year to eight months, minimum of prision correccional as minimum penalty, to three years and six months and twenty one days, medium of prision correccional as maximum penalty.

 

In Article 2, Section 14 of the1987 Constitution, the State recognizes the role of women in nation-building and ensures the equality before the law of women and men.[3] Article 2 (g) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) requires the State to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices that constitute discrimination against women. Article 16 also calls on the State Parties to take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women and ensure equality of men and women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations.

 

There is a need to amend and update Article 333 and 334 regarding the evidentiary requirement of the crimes against chastity and the penalty for the concubine and the man charged with adultery. Equality before the law should be considered. The proof for a husband who committed concubinage should also be the same as the proof of adultery. The need for the proof that a husband kept the mistress in the conjugal dwelling or cohabit in any other place should be removed because as observed nowadays, men are more likely involved in extra-marital affairs than women. One reason to be considered for this act of men is that concubinage is harder to prove than adultery. So the penalty for adultery and concubinage should be increased in order to discourage the commission of these crimes and protect the marriage because it is the foundation of the family, and the family is the foundation of the nation.

 

A counter-argument regarding the discriminatory effect of Article 333 and 334 of the RPC contends that penalty for women in adultery should be higher because an illicit affair between a wife and her paramour could result in an illegitimate child who would become the unknowing husband’s spurious heir.

 

This argument is not enough to be the reason why the Congress had not yet approved the bill to amend the Article 333 and 334. It is more likely because there are more men in the Congress than women. For men, it has been normal and blatant that most of them commit infidelity to boost their morale. Unfaithful husbands assess that infidelity is okay as long as they can afford it and/or provide the material needs of the legitimate family. Other reasons of husbands for their infidelity are lack of sexual intimacy with the wife, inability to communicate of both spouses in healthy ways, being disillusioned with marriage and poor relationship with Christ. [4]  For women, some of the reasons why they commit infidelity are (1) when she feels underappreciated, neglected or ignored, (2) she craves intimacy, (3) bored or lonely, (4) never feels fully loved and appreciated, (5) she has intimacy disorder. [5]

 

Various studies show that men are more likely to commit marital infidelity than women. From the website of East Asian Pastoral Institute, Ted Gonzales, S.J. wrote that the husband’s infidelity is a major concern in Filipino marriages. Carandang (1987) noted that the wives rank infidelity as the number one family stressor. Lacar (1993) reported that male infidelity is the most frequent reason for marital separation. Vancio (1980, 1977) cites male infidelity as a major issue for marital break-ups in Metro Manila. In the McCann Metro Manila Study (1995), half of the 485 male respondents reported having had extramarital affairs. Relucio (1995) in her in-depth interview with seven separated women noted that infidelity was found to be a common problem. [6]

 

Aside from the counter-argument regarding the discriminatory effect of the punishment of Article 333 and 334, there is also an argument to decriminalize adultery and concubinage. According to the United Nations Working Group on decriminalization against women in law and in practice, “maintaining adultery as a criminal offense, even when it applies to both women and men means in practice that women mainly will continue to face extreme vulnerabilities and violation of their human rights to dignity, privacy and equality”. By decriminalizing adultery, the State eliminates such risk and vulnerabilities to further discrimination. The criminalization of infidelity is an invitation of too much government interference into the personal lives of people including on matters that should be dealt with privately. [7]

 

The Family Code of the Philippines states that marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. [8] To rebut the argument regarding decriminalization of marital infidelity, striking this off in the list of crimes would rather destroy the sanctity of marriage because this will be done easily by any or even both of the spouses. There is a need for the State to interfere in the marriage because the Constitution considers marriage as an inviolable social institution and is the foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric. Hence, the preservation of the family is not just the concern of the family members, but of the State as well.

 

Decriminalization can be a public health issue too. Without a law criminalizing marital infidelity, a married spouse may be involved with someone already infected with Sexually Transmitted Diseases (STD). Since most married couples do not routinely use contraceptives, the innocent spouse may be infected with STD.

 

In order to settle conflicting issues regarding the decriminalization of marital infidelity, the solution to be resorted is the one favorable to the State and most importantly to the family. The treatment of marital infidelity as a crime against chastity to deter spouses in committing it should remain. But amendments to the evidentiary requirements and punishment should be done in order to balance the discriminatory provisions of the law.

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

Therefore, the punishment for adultery and concubinage provided in the Revised Penal Code is discriminatory and gender-biased. Adultery and concubinage comprises marital infidelity in the Philippines. Beforehand, it was a common practice of the ancestors as a status symbol. But at present it is considered as a crime against chastity.

 

In other countries with different cultures, marital infidelity is treated differently. For some, it is an acceptable norm of the society which had been passed by their ancestors. While for others, it is considered as a crime. Different punishments are imposed by different countries who consider it as a crime.

 

The punishment in the Philippines is biased and discriminatory because there is a higher burden put on wives than on husbands. The disparity of treatment of the law is seen in the evidentiary requirement for adultery and concubinage and there is a huge difference in the sentence for those who are convicted.

 

There is a need to revise the punishment and the evidentiary requirements to effect equality between men and women as stated in the Constitution. Several bills have already been submitted but are still pending in the Congress. It has been announced that the President had already approved the new Penal Code which will be an update of the provisions of the current RPC. But it has not yet been issued to the public, so it is hoped that the punishment for adultery and concubinage will be included in the amended provisions.

 

REFERENCES

 

1 Section 497, Indian Penal Code

2 https://en/m/wikipedia.org/wiki/Sexuality_in_the_Philippines;

  Brewer, Carolyn, Holy Confrontation: Religion, Gender and Sexuality in the Philippines 1521-1685, 2001 edition, Manila.

3 The Revised  Penal Code of the Philippines,  2016 edition. RBSI, Manila

4 http://www.christian-marriage-today.com/causes-of-infidelity.html

5 https://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-weiss/women-cheating-5-reasons-for-female-infidelity_b_1936934.html)

6 www.eapi.org.ph

7 http://smorgasbordandothers.blogspot.com/2015/08/marital-infidelity-to-punish-or-not-to_21.html?m=1

8 Rabuya, Elmer T., Persons and Family Relations, 2017 edition, RBSI, Manila.

9 https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/54225-philippine-laws-unfair-woman

10 https://www.filipiknow.net/weird-laws-in-the-philippines/amp/

11 http://www.philstar.com/opinion/2015/06/30/1471565/amending-marital-infidelity-law

12 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/southkorea/11873408/South-Korea-sees-surge-in-infidelity-after-law-change-ending-jail-for-adultery.html

13 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2014-07/03/content_17639210.htm

14 https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/07/06/national/media-national/equal-opportunity-infidelity-comes-to-japan/#.Wdw-UFuCyUk

15 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adultery#Adultery_and_the_law

16 http://pcw.gov.ph/wpla/eliminating-discrimination-against-women-revised-penal-code-rpc-decriminalizing-adultery-and-concubinage

 

 

 

Case Digest: Angeles University Foundation vs. City of Angeles G.R. No. 189999, June 27, 2012

(Topic: Legislative Power – Power of Taxation)

Petitioner: Angeles University Foundation

Respondents: City of Angeles, Juliet Quinsaat, in her capacity as Treasurer of Angeles City and Engr. Donato N. Dizon, in his capacity as Acting Angeles City Building Official

 

Facts:

Petitioner Angeles University Foundation (AUF) is an educational institution established on May 25, 1962 and was converted into a non-stock, non-profit education foundation under the provisions of Republic Act (RA) No. 6055 on December 4, 1975.

On August 2005, petitioner filed with the Office of the City Building Official in the City of Angeles Pampanga an application for a building permit for the construction of an 11-storey building in its main Campus. A Building Permit Fee Assessment and an order of payment for Locational Clearance Fees was issued by the said office.

Petitioner claimed, through a letter addressed to respondents City Treasurer and Acting City Building Official, that it is exempted from the payment of the building permit and locational clearance fees and cited legal opinions rendered by the Department of Justice (DOJ).

Respondents referred the matter to the Bureau of Local Government Finance (BLGF) of the Department of Finance, which in turn endorsed the query to the DOJ. DOJ replied and affirmed the claim of the petitioner.

Despite the petitioner’s plea, however, respondents refused to issue the building permit. Petitioner then appealed the matter to the City Mayor but received no written response. Consequently, petitioner paid under protest a total of P826,662.99 and the Building Permit and other documents were issued afterwards.

Petitioner formally requested the respondents to refund the fees it paid under protest through letters dated June 15, 2006 and August 7, 2006. But the respondents denied the claim for refund.

On August 31, 2006, petitioner filed a Complaint before the trial court seeking for the refund of P826,662.99 plus interest at a rate of 12% per annum, and for attorneys fee in the amount of P300,000.00 and litigation expenses.

On September 21, 2007, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner. Respondents appeal to the CA which reversed the trial court’s decision. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.

So the petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

 

Issue:

Whether or not the building permit fee is a tax from which petitioner is exempt.

 

Discussion:

The building permit fee is neither a tax nor a charge on property. Based on Sections 102, 103 and 104, the building permit fee is a regulatory imposition on certain activities the owner may conduct either to build such structures or to repair, alter, renovate or demolish the same. Since building permit fees are not charges on property, they are not impositions from which petitioner is exempt.

As to petitioner’s argument that the building permit fees collected by respondents are in reality taxes because the primary purpose is to raise revenues for the local government unit, the same does not hold water.

A charge of a fixed sum which bears no relation at all to the cost of inspection and regulation may be held to be a tax rather than an exercise of the police power. In this case, the Secretary of Public Works and Highways who is mandated to prescribe and fix the amount of fees and other charges that the Building Official shall collect in connection with the performance of regulatory functions, has promulgated and issued the Implementing Rules and Regulations which provide for the bases of assessment of such fees.

The court cited the case of Chevron Philippines, Inc. vs. Bases Conversion Development Authority and explained the difference between tax and regulation:

In distinguishing tax and regulation as a form of police power, the determining factor is the purpose of the implemented measure. If the purpose is primarily to raise revenue, then it will be deemed a tax even though the measure results in some form of regulation. On the other hand, if the purpose is primarily to regulate, then it is deemed a regulation and an exercise of the police power of the state, even though incidentally, revenue is generated.     

In Gerochi v. Department of Energy, the Court stated:

The conservative and pivotal distinction between these two (2) powers rests in the purpose for which the charge is made. If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally raised does not make the imposition a tax.

 

Held:

The petition was denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.

Case Digest: Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008

(Topic: Executive Privilege – Constitutional Law 1)

Petitioner: Romulo L. Neri

Respondents: Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce, and Senate Committee on National Defense and Security

Facts:

Petitioner Romulo Neri, then Director General of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), was invited by the respondent Senate Committees to attend their joint investigation on the alleged anomalies in the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project. This project was contracted by the Philippine Government with the Chinese firm Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE), which involved the amount of US$329,481,290. When he testified before the Senate Committees, he disclosed that then Commission on Elections Chairman Benjamin Abalos, brokering for ZTE, offered him P200 million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege.” In particular, he refused to answer the questions on 1.) whether or not the President followed up the NBN Project, 2.) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and 3.) whether or not she directed him to approve it.

Later on, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to petitioner, requiring him to appear and testify on 20 November 2007. However, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita sent a letter dated 15 November to the Committees requesting them to dispense with Neri’s testimony on the ground of executive privilege. Ermita invoked the privilege on the ground that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China,” and given the confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to the President, Neri “cannot provide the Committee any further details of these conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.” Thus, on 20 November, Neri did not appear before the respondent Committees.

On 22 November, respondents issued a Show Cause Letter to Neri requiring him to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt for his failure to attend the scheduled hearing on 20 November. On 29 November, Neri replied to the Show Cause Letter and explained that he did not intend to snub the Senate hearing, and requested that if there be new matters that were not yet taken up during his first appearance, he be informed in advance so he can prepare himself. He added that his non-appearance was upon the order of the President, and that his conversation with her dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and diplomatic matters relating to the impact of the bribery scandal involving high government officials and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines. Respondents found the explanation unsatisfactory, and later on issued an Order citing Neri in contempt and consequently ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until he appears and gives his testimony.

Neri filed the petition asking the Court to nullify both the Show Cause Letter and the Contempt Order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and stressed that his refusal to answer the three questions was anchored on a valid claim to executive privilege in accordance with the ruling in the landmark case of Senate vs. Ermita (G.R. No. 169777, 20 April 2006). For its part, the Senate Committees argued that they did not exceed their authority in issuing the assailed orders because there is no valid justification for Neri’s claim to executive privilege. In addition, they claimed that the refusal of petitioner to answer the three questions violates the people’s right to public information, and that the executive is using the concept of executive privilege as a means to conceal the criminal act of bribery in the highest levels of government.

Issue:

Whether or not the three questions that petitioner Neri refused to answer were covered by executive privilege, making the arrest order issued by the respondent Senate Committees void.

Discussion:

Citing the case of United States vs. Nixon (418 U.S. 683), the Court laid out the three elements needed to be complied with in order for the claim to executive privilege to be valid. These are: 1.) the protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power; 2.) it must be authored, solicited, and received by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President; and, 3.) it may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence,” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

In the present case, Executive Secretary Ermita claimed executive privilege on the argument that the communications elicited by the three questions “fall under conversation and correspondence between the President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy decision-making process,” and that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.” It is clear then that the basis of the claim is a matter related to the quintessential and non-delegable presidential power of diplomacy or foreign relations.

As to the second element, the communications were received by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner Neri can be considered a close advisor, being a member of the President’s Cabinet.

And as to the third element, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. Presidential communications are presumptive privilege and that the presumption can be overcome only by mere showing of public need by the branch seeking access to such conversations. In the present case, respondent Committees failed to show a compelling or critical need for the answers to the three questions in the enactment of any law under Sec. 21, Art. VI. Instead, the questions veer more towards the exercise of the legislative oversight function under Sec. 22, Art. VI. As ruled in Senate vs. Ermita, “the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.”

Neri’s refusal to answer based on the claim of executive privilege does not violate the people’s right to information on matters of public concern simply because Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution itself provides that this right is “subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.”

Held:

The divided Supreme Court (voting 9-6) was convinced that the three questions are covered by presidential communications privilege, and that this privilege has been validly claimed by the executive department, enough to shield petitioner Neri from any arrest order the Senate may issue against him for not answering such questions.

The petition was granted. The subject Order dated January 30, 2008, citing petitioner in contempt of the Senate Committee and directing his arrest and detention was nullified.

Case Digest: Reyes vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013

(Topic: Legislative Department – Constitutional Law 1)

Petitioner: Regina Ongsiako Reyes

Respondents: Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and Joseph Socorro B. Tan

Facts:

Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the lone district of Marinduque. Respondent, a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC a petition for the cancellation of petitioner’s COC. On October 31, 2012, the respondent filed the amended petition on the ground that the petitioner’s COC contained material misrepresentations regarding the petitioner’s marital status, residency, date of birth and citizenship. Respondent alleged that the petitioner is an American citizen and filed in February 8, 2013 a manifestation with motion to admit newly discovered evidence and amended last exhibit.

On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution cancelling the petitioner’s COC on the basis that petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to comply with the requirements of Republic Act (RA) No. 9225.

The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 8, 2013. But on May 14, 2013 the COMELEC en banc promulgated a Resolution denying the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.

On May 18, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 elections and on June 5, 2013 took her oath of office before the Speaker of House of Representatives. She has yet to assume office at noon of June 30, 2013.

On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring the May 14, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC en banc final and executory.

Petitioner then filed before the court Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order.

Issues:

  1. Whether or not the COMELEC has the jurisdiction over the petitioner who is a duly proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of member of the House of Representative.
  2. Whether or not the COMELEC erred in its ruling that the petitioner is illegible to run for office

Discussion:

  1. Pursuant to Section 17, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution, the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election returns and qualification of the members of House of Representative.
  2. In R.A 9925, for a respondent to reacquire Filipino citizenship and become eligible for public office, the law requires that she must have accomplished the following 1) take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the consul-general of the Philippine Consulate in the USA, and 2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. In the case at bar, there is no showing that petitioner complied with the requirements. Petitioner’s oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as the oath of allegiance in compliance with RA 9225. As to the issue of residency, the court approved the ruling if the COMELEC that a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile of origin. Upon reacquisition of Filipino citizenship, he must still show that he chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines through positive acts, and the period of his residency shall be counted from the time he made it his domicile of choice. In this case, there is no showing that the petitioner reacquired her Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude  that the petitioner renounced her American citizenship, it follows that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA. Petitioner claim that she served as Provincial Administrator of the province of Marinduque from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011 is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency for she has never recognized her domicile in Marinduque as she remains to be an American citizen. No amount of her stay in the said locality can substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.

Held:

The instant petition was DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC.

Never Stop Learning, Never Stop Believing

Learning is a continuous process. And with learning comes growth. Not just in one aspect of life but it’s more of overall growth.

In my current work, I have felt the need to continue to learn and pursue the study of law. I am hoping that the legal knowledge that I will acquire and the skills that I will develop throughout the entire course will enable me to perform my duties and responsibilities more effectively and efficiently. My education, experience and development will aid me to know the legal aspects of work-related transactions and be able to resolve legal issues that may arise.

In the pursuit of this study, it is important to know the values and skills that one must possess in order to be a good lawyer. Some of those are integrity, perseverance, professionalism, judgment, research skills, analytical skills and good communication skills. With my experiences and career development, I think I already possess those values and skills but what I have right now is not enough so i have to keep on learning and improving myself.  As what the professors told us, we must learn how to think and act like a lawyer.

Aside from being beneficial to my work, by studying law I can use my knowledge to address social issues in the country. I will contribute to the community my perspective and experiences with the hope to improve the quality of intellectual life. With the aid of social media and this blog site, I can post my opinions, reactions and legal basis regarding social issues. While to enhance the legal profession, after I become a lawyer, I would like to be given the opportunity to teach law. Imparting knowledge to students is the best way to improve not just the legal profession but also the future of the society.

Thus, achieving the goals you’ve set should not be the end of your learning process. Set another goal and continue. For continuous learning is the minimum requirement of success in life. And life is a continuous learning experience.